The Shadow-gloom and Weight of the Sacred

Credit: Masaaki Komori
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Continuing my reading of Sources of the Self by Charles Taylor. Click Here for my why I'm writing about this on my blog.

In order to explore the "background picture" (i.e., ontology) of our moral decisions and intuitions, Taylor identifies the process of "making sense". "Making sense" is the articulation of what makes our moral decisions and intuitions,well, sensible. "What is articulated here is the background we assume and draw on in any claim to rightness, part of which we are forced to spell out when we have to defend our responses as right ones" (9). The theistic account appeals to the status of humans as God's creatures, as made in his image. Meanwhile, the secular account invokes the dignity of rational life. Beyond making these two distinctions, "making sense" of one's moral ontology becomes problematic, even controversial, due to three reasons.

1. The moral ontology behind a person's views is implicit--they don't think about the bases of universal respect, for example, because it is comprehensively accepted as axiomatic. "Whether one has a theistic or secular foundation rarely comes up, except in certain very special controversies, like about abortion" (9).

2. The exploration of moral ontology may be resisted. This is because there is a (perceived?) lack of fit between what people believe and what they need to "make sense" of their moral reactions. Some naturalists (I think "naturalists", though broader than "atheist" may be used to denote atheism, as well as a the nature side of the nature vs. nurture debate--but I could be wrong on that) view moral ontology as irrelevant; they suppress the discussion. Even though they are willing to discuss moral reactions and what objects are fit of moral reactions, they suppress the "making sense" of moral ontology.

3. The uncertain nature of our moral beliefs. Many people offended by the naturalist's tendency to deny moral ontology embrace that their moral reactions are based upon something, but they are uncertain or confounded as to what that basis actually is. If given the choice between moral ontology and secular ontology, many people would not be ready or willing to make a choice with complete conviction. "Something similar arises for many of them on the question of what makes human life worth living or what confers meaning on their individual lives. Most of us are still in the process of groping for answers here" (10).

These issues of "making sense" can take another form that Taylor states he will not directly address in this book. That is, both the moral ontology and the secular ontology cannot be an adequate basis for our moral reactions. It must be one or the other because, as Dostoyevsky has addressed, "If God does not exist, then everything is permitted."

I am glad that Taylor isn't going to venture down this fourth form confronting our "making sense" of our moral decisions because I think it seems the most problematic to resolve, at least for my pea-sized brain. This process of summarizing Taylor's book is really helping me interact with the it, so I do intend to keep doing posting on this material. But, hopefully, I'll be able to address more than three pages per post!